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I’d like to thank Alexandra, Max, and Christoph for inviting me to participate in this
fascinating exchange.  As an American, I feel like the outsider here.  Moreover,
I have just written a book (in part from an American perspective, but also deeply
grounded in integration history) that argues that the EU is best understood as
‘administrative, not constitutional’.  So it should perhaps be unsurprising that I am
reluctant to endorse the deeply constitutionalist ‘reverse Solange’ proposal of Armin
von Bogdandy and his team. I generally join in the cogent reservations already
expressed by several commenters (notably by Pál Sonnevend, Anna Katharina
Mangold, and Daniel Thym), but allow me to add a few additional thoughts.
The ‘reverse Solange’ proposal undoubtedly constitutes a creative way of
augmenting the role of the CJEU as a commitment mechanism in the area of
fundamental rights beyond the implementation of Union law, i.e., by circumventing
the limitation specified in Article 51 CFREU via a teleological linkage to Union
citizenship.  To argue against the proposal would seem, in American parlance, like
arguing against ‘mom and apple pie’—and who wants to do that?
Particularly in view of the deep concerns we all share over the current Hungarian
regime (about which my colleagues Kim Scheppele and Jan-Werner Müller
have been struggling mightily to highlight), I am deeply sympathetic to the desire
to develop effective mechanisms to combat any member state’s descent into
authoritarianism.  But I have reservations about whether this proposal is even
necessary as a tool against the disturbing slippage of the Hungarian regime. What
it will accomplish, rather, is a potentially profound change in the nature European
public law, while adding only marginally to the legal arsenal in the struggle to
vindicate fundamental rights.
Bogdandy and his team claim that their ‘approach neither creates new and
unexpected obligations for the Member States nor adds new competences
for the Union as such; only the Organkompetenz of the CJEU, but not the
Verbandskompetenz of the EU is affected’.  It is more than a little ironic, however,
that in support of this statement, they then claim their proposal ‘resembles the
famous Van Gend en Loos line of jurisprudence inasmuch as it complements a
centralized enforcement mechanism with “the vigilance of individuals concerned
to protect their rights” and interjudicial cooperation’.  This is ironic precisely
because Van Gend en Loos is almost certainly the most significant (because most
fundamental) of the Court’s arrogation of institutional power in its history: the right
to police member state compliance via the preliminary reference mechanism, rather
than limiting itself to the infringement procedure.  This step was taken on the basis
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of just the sort of heroic legal logic and teleological reasoning that is also evident in
this proposal. From an American perspective, this proposal thus seems, well, so . . .
European.
Insofar as Van Gend en Loos was itself concerned, despite the evident textual
weakness in the Court’s reasoning there, the member states long ago acquiesced
in the Court’s effort to augment its commitment function in the context of free-
movement obligations under supranational law.  And perhaps for good reason: To
put it in the jargon of modern principal-agent theory, the Van Gend en Loos Court
recognized the need for ‘fire alarms’ (preliminary references) in addition to ‘police
patrols’ (infringement actions) to police member state compliance in this area.
But there is a key difference between the free-movement context and the
fundamental-rights focus of this proposal.  One can understand why the Van
Gend en Loos Court felt the infringement procedure was inadequate to police the
manifold ways in which a member state might violate free-movement obligations in
the nooks and crannies of its legislative or regulatory apparatus.  But the sorts of
‘systemic failures’ in the protection of fundamental rights that this proposal purports
to target are a lot more difficult to hide. Indeed, Bogdandy and his team explicitly
reject the use of ‘reverse Solange’ to target ‘simple and isolated fundamental rights
infringements’.  Moreover, the Commission’s ‘accelerated infringement procedure’
against Hungary would suggest that the existing ‘police patrols’ in European public
law are proving adequate to the task of monitoring member state compliance where
‘systemic failures’ occur.  There is little need to resort to the creative lawyering
represented by this proposal; in fact, by excluding ‘simple and isolated fundamental
rights infringements’ from its coverage, Bogdandy and his team greatly undermine
the analogy to Van Gend en Loos on which they ultimately come to rely.
More troubling to me, however, is the mindset toward European public law, and
more particularly toward the role of courts and litigation vis-à-vis politics, that this
proposal seems to reflect. If there is an autonomous supranational ‘constitutionalism’
in the EU (which I am normally hesitant to acknowledge), it is undoubtedly grounded
in fundamental rights, i.e., in the ‘sovereignty of the individual’ against public
authority, wherever located. The institutional means for realizing this form of
autonomous constitutionalism is necessarily adjudicative power, whether national or
supranational, something with deep roots in Western conceptions of the rule of law.
 When properly tailored to the task of protecting individual rights in specific cases—
avoiding spillover into the realm of broad-gauged regulatory power—the claims of
this sort of supranational constitutionalism are generally plausible to me.
But this proposal seems much more indicative of a less plausible (but more
ambitious) claim to ‘multilevel’ or ‘plural’ constitutionalism in the EU.  It is grounded,
in effect, in an autonomous sovereignty over and above the member states (despite
the fact that multilevel or plural constitutionalists generally like to avoid the language
of sovereignty, which normally seems so passé).  From this perspective, although
supranational institutions are formally created by a treaty, they necessarily come to
enjoy, by virtue of functional demand or legal logic divorced from intent, a normative
legitimacy independent of any treaty commitments plausibly made by the member
states themselves.  In this sort of supranational constitutionalism, we are no longer
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talking about protecting the sovereignty of the individual against states or other
kinds of public authority; rather, we are, in effect, talking about the sovereignty of
a new political community above the member states, whose authority is ultimately
not grounded in treaty commitments but in the inexorable logic or normative
attractiveness of the integration process itself.
Despite the efforts of many ‘constitutional pluralists’ in the EU over the last several
years, the evolution of European public law seems clearly to repudiate the existence
of this second, more ambitious sort of supranational constitutionalism in the
integration process.  This is most clearly reflected in the principle of conferral in
Article 5 TEU, as well as the Kompetenz-Kompetenz jurisprudence of national
high courts.  And yet, by stressing that their ‘approach neither creates new and
unexpected obligations for the Member States nor adds new competences for the
Union as such’, Bogdandy and his team are clearly alive to this limitation. But I do
not think they successfully overcome it. Rather, they engage, as I said, in precisely
the sort of heroic legal logic and teleological reasoning that is so indicative of the
CJEU over its history (it’s for that reason that I have little doubt this proposal will be
taken very seriously in Luxembourg).
But that does not change the fact that this proposal will be perceived, by national
high courts at the very least, as an effort to circumvent limitations that the member
states have inserted, for better or worse, into European public law.  This proposal
ultimately reminds me of one of the most famous statements on unconstitutional
delegation in American jurisprudence, which rejected a similar claim to broad-
gauged normative power because it was ‘not canalized within banks that keep it from
overflowing. It is unconfined and vagrant . . . . This is delegation running riot.  No
such plenitude of power is susceptible of transfer’. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 US 495, 550, 553 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring).
As Antje Wiener points out in her comments, the ‘reverse Solange’ proposal
really is about ‘changing stateness’ in the integration process.  But the point of
the Kompetenz-Kompetenz jurisprudence of the national high courts over the
last two decades has been to strike a balance in that process of change.  On the
one hand, integration has clearly demanded the delegation of normative power to
supranational bodies; on the other hand, democratic and constitutional legitimacy
has remained fundamentally national (subject, of course, to the demands of human
rights).  The issue really is: What ‘plenitude of power is [in fact] susceptible of
transfer’ while maintaining some semblance of constitutional democracy on the
national level in a historically recognizable sense?  No doubt, as I have written about
Greece in the Eurozone crisis, modern governance entails significant limitations
on ‘sovereignty’ as a consequence of legal commitments, whether national or
suprantional (although for important qualifications of that argument, see here).  But
recognizing the changing nature of sovereignty based in legal commitments is not a
license to allow supranational adjudicators to make ‘unconfined and vagrant’ claims
to normative power.  This must be true no matter how heroically logical these claims
are, or however much they appear based in a teleological understanding of the
substance of, say, Union citizenship.
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We should recall that ‘not all legal problems are can be solved legally’, as the late
Neil MacCormick once rightly warned, and that ‘[r]esolving such problems . . .
is matter for circumspection and for political as much as legal judgment’.  In this
instance, European lawyers and judges would do much better to respect the political
limitations on the enforcement of fundamental rights that are expressed in Article
51 CFREU and not allow them to be circumvented legally by way of teleological
linkage to Union citizenship. Otherwise, by way of creative lawyering, integration
would run the risk of ‘delegation running riot’, effectuating a fundamental change in
the nature of European public law without the requisite democratic and constitutional
underpinnings.
Peter Lindseth is a professor for international and comparative law at University of
Connecticut and currently a Daimler Fellow at the American Academy in Berlin.
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